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Mark Roe's article comparing German, Japanese, and U.S. corporate
governance extends his important research concerning the effect of political
constraints on the organization of U.S. corporations.' In this latest publication,
Roe painstakingly compares governance arrangements, highlighting the
variability in business organization that exists across nations, to obtain
guidance for reforming U.S. institutions. This is valuable comparative
institutional research, but the lesson to be drawn from the mutability of the
corporate form is opaque. As Roe suggests, the legal and institutional
differences across the three nations make it difficult to ascertain whether one
approach to corporate governance is superior to another and whether a superior
organizational form could be successfully transplanted into another setting. Yet
without a means to make comparative judgments, the likelihood that helpful
lessons can be drawn from other nations' experiences for reforming our own
institutions is diminished, and the rationale for making the comparisons in the
first place becomes problematic.
Roe does suggest that German and Japanese firms have been subject to
less debilitating political constraints on their organization than U.S. firms
(because banks were permitted to exercise control over industrial corporations),
although he indicates that this may be changing as recent political trends in
Germany and Japan seem to resemble U.S. politics. But he does not make
clear, at least to my satisfaction, why he reaches this comparative political
judgment. Why should we view the corporate organizational form produced by
a political process that empowers banks as preferable to a process that does not
without evidence of the superiority of the former organizational form?
t Allen Duffy/Class of 1960 Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The discussion of the literature on
comparative productivity and the historical examples from U.S. corporate finance in this Comment are
taken from my forthcoming monograph, The Genius of American Corporate Law.
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One implication of Roe's thesis that U.S. politics, because it limits the
activities of large banks, produces undesirable corporate ownership
patterns-patterns that are more politically than economically inspired-
compared to that of other nations is that foreign firms' corporate governance
arrangements are preferable, -and that the United States ought to adjust its laws
shaping corporate governance to match those of other nations. Roe expresses
considerable ambivalence concerning this implication of his thesis, but he
offers two grounds for permitting U.S. firms to adopt non-U.S. institutions: the
organization of German and Japanese firms improves decisionmaking and
organizational performance, and more choice is better than less.2 The
implication of the former contention is that German and Japanese firms are
more competitive than their U.S. counterparts-how else would we be able to
make a comparative assessment of their performance or decisionmaking? Given
the data on international competitiveness detailed in this Comment, Roe does
not eibrace this implication, although he does not draw back on the
hypothesized organizational benefits. This creates a muddle, as it is
exceedingly difficult to get a fix on the analysis, much less to draw any
lessons for corporate law reform. The implication of the latter contention is
that U.S. firms would choose to adopt this alternative organizational form were
it available. While this implication is also a contestable claim, the core notion
that investors ought to be permitted the choice, is, at least in my opinion, less
SO.
My Comment has one principal, quite simple, point: the central lesson to
be drawn from Roe's research in comparative corporate governance is that
there is no compelling evidence to support a preference for German or
Japanese organizational forms and hence for their adaptation to U.S. firms.
First, I review the extensive data indicating that the widely held background
assumption of the superior competitiveness of German and Japanese firms over
U.S. firms is mistaken. Such an assumption is key for drawing particular
lessons from comparative corporate law, such as preferring particular
institutions; if German and Japanese firms are not more productive and are in
fact less productive than U.S. firms then there is no clear cut reason to emulate
their corporate governance arrangements. Second, I provide some anecdotes,
for that is all we have now, culled from the history of U.S. corporate finance
and current relationships between U.S. firms and banks, to suggest that even
were we to alter U.S. banking regulation to permit German- and Japanese-style
bank control of industrial corporations, the result may be different from what
we see abroad. These data make plain that the most important lesson from
examining institutions across time and space is that private parties are quite
resourceful in adapting their affairs to minimize the adverse effects of
regulation. Third, I address more directly the adequacy of the political
2. Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1931-32.
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distinctiveness Roe attributes to the United States in producing ineffective
institutions of corporate governance by noting that the German and Japanese
political systems have intruded on corporate governance on some dimensions
of importance to shareholders far more than the U.S. regime of financial
regulation. I conclude with a word about Roe's criticism of agency cost
theories of corporate organization, which mistakenly views such theories as
predicting uniformity, as opposed to variety in the corporate form.
All of this is not to say that U.S. laws restricting bank ownership of
corporate stock or separating investment and commercial banking functions
should be retained. I believe that they should be rolled back. But the rationale
for such a policy reversal cannot be readily found in the study of comparative
institutions; it can be located more easily instead in our own corporate law
tradition. Namely, it is the policy most consonant with the competitive and
enabling approach of U.S. corporate law, which, by permitting experimentation
and innovation in the choice of institutions, tends to maximize firm value.3
I. COMPARATIVE PRODUCTIVITY AND DIFFERENCES IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
No comparative empirical study has shown that corporate governance
arrangements affect productivity. Since no immediate evidence is available, a
preference for German and Japanese organizational forms must hinge upon the
significance attributed to the fact that those nations have for some time
surpassed the United States on a variety of productivity growth measures. For
instance, growth in productivity measured by gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita, from 1870 to 1979 was 691% for the United States but 1396% for
Germany and 1653% for Japan.4 As measured by the growth rate in GDP per
work-hour from 1970 to 1979, the growth in productivity was 1.92% for the
United States, 4.5% for Germany and 5.03% for Japan.5 The contention of
superiority has to focus on these relative growth rates because in terms of
absolute productivity, the United States has retained the lead.
The most comprehensive study of productivity to date, by William
Baumol, Sue Anne Batey Blackman, and Edward Wolff, shows that the
significance of differences in short-term productivity growth rates has been
vastly overstated.6 In this study the authors make several important points
3. For an extended discussion of the benefits of competition in the production of corporation laws and
an enabling approach to corporate governance, see ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAW (forthcoming 1993).
4. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL Er AL., PRODUCTIVITY AND AMERICAN LEADERSHIP: THE LONG ViEW 13
(1989).
5. Id. at 88.
6. The data and analysis in the following paragraphs are taken entirely from the Baumol, Blackman
and Wolff study, especially as reported in id. at 14, 65, 68-71, 89-90, 258-260. This study is particularly
interesting because it is a reversal of the authors' earlier critical assessment of U.S. productivity
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about productivity measures that are critical to understanding their significance.
First, productivity growth rates are extremely volatile in the short run and
hence are best estimated over long periods. Second, the decline in U.S.
productivity growth in recent years is a decline only in comparison to the
phenomenal spurt in U.S. productivity in the years following World War II.
The current growth rate is, in fact, similar to the United States' historic normal
growth rate. The extraordinary increase in U.S. productivity growth in the
postwar period equals (and thus can be seen to compensate for) the steep
decrease in productivity growth during the Great Depression. Indeed, a growth
trendline shows that growth in U.S. productivity has remained constant from
1880 through 1980. Moreover, all industrial nations experienced the same
temporal pattern of productivity growth rates, an unusual postwar increase and
a slowdown during the 1970's.
Third, and most important, differences in short-run productivity growth
rates are not indicia of economic decline because of the phenomenon of
international convergence. When one nation's productivity is superior to that
of other nations, those nations that are not too far behind can catch up as they
learn from the leader through the transfer of technology, and so performance
levels will converge. The laggard countries have more to learn from the leader
than the leader does from them, and consequently, "those who were initially
behind must advance more rapidly than those who were ahead. Otherwise, the
distance between them could not possibly narrow.' 7 Baumol, Blackman, and
Wolff exhaustively detail the body of evidence supporting the international
convergence conjecture.
More recent works, including an update of productivity measures through
1990 by Baumol and Wolff and a study of productivity in the service sector
by McKinsey and Company, reinforce the critical assessment of the
significance of comparisons across productivity growth rates in the Baumol,
Blackman, and Wolff study and indicate that absolute U.S. productivity has
continued to exceed that of Germany and Japan.8 Baumol and Wolff's latest
data on manufacturing performance indicate that the rate of productivity
growth in Germany has, in fact, been lower than that of the United States for
over a decade (a decline predating the economic difficulties brought on by
reunification). The data also indicate that Japan's productivity growth rate has
performance in PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND U.S. COMPEITIVENESS (William J. Baumol & Kenneth
McLennan eds., 1985).
7. BAUMOL Er AL., supra note 4, at 90. A further fact supporting the convergence hypothesis is that
the lag in the rate of U.S. productivity growth compared to other nations is a longstanding phenomenon,
going back a century. Id. at 87-89.
8. William J. Baumol & Edward N. Wolff, Comparative U.S. Productivity Performance and the State
of Manufacturing: The Latest Data, 10 CVSTARR NEWSLETMER (Center for Applied Econ., N.Y.U.), 1992,
at 1; McKinsey Global Institute, Service Sector Productivity (Oct. 1992) (unpublished study, on file with
author). The McKinsey study received assistance from several distinguished economists including Martin
Baily, Francis Bator, and Robert Solow.
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slowed down considerably in recent years and is now not much greater than
that of the United States, while the Japanese level of productivity is still far
lower than the U.S. level.
The McKinsey study reviews other studies' findings of superior U.S
productivity in the manufacturing sector and then presents five case studies
from the service sector (airline, retail banking, restaurant, general merchandise
retailing, and telecommunications industries). Because the value of output in
a service industry is not always quantifiable, it is difficult to measure the
performance of such an industry. The study consequently examines a variety
of labor productivity measures to evaluate comparative performance. The
findings reveal that, in each of the five industries, labor productivity is higher
in the United States than in Europe or Japan. The authors attribute the superior
performance of U.S. firms to the greater (domestic) competition that they
experience.
The United States' lower rate of productivity growth compared to that of
Germany and Japan in the postwar period is therefore best understood as a
manifestation of the catch-up from international convergence. We do not need
to introduce differences in corporate governance regimes to explain differences
in performance. This explanation of changing relative rates of productivity
growth does not imply that low relative productivity growth is not a public
policy concern. It is. The hard question for public policy is whether another
nation will eventually surpass the United States as our long-term historic
growth rate may not be sufficient to retain world economic leadership. The
answer, in my judgment, will not be found in mimicking other nations'
corporate governance arrangements nor in comparative study of such
institutions.
While we cannot predict whether the United States will be surpassed as the
economic leader, the key factors that economists believe affect absolute
productivity performance are the national savings rate (investment), the labor
force's education, and the magnitude of efforts devoted to basic and applied
research.' There is no theory or evidence relating any of these factors to
corporate governance arrangements. It is telling that commentators who are
concerned about the effect of corporate governance on comparative economic
performance do not mention these key factors; the probable explanation is that
it is extremely difficult to relate such fundamental factors to corporate
governance patterns.
The difference in corporate structure that Roe details and suggests is
significantly related to performance-U.S. firms have dispersed stock
ownership that permits managers to run firms without oversight, whereas
German and Japanese managers are actively monitored by banks-were all in
place considerably before World War II, no later than the Great Depression.
9. BAUMOL Er AL., supra note 4, at 258-60.
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This is well before the postwar years of the steep relative decline in the U.S.
rate of productivity growth; in the prewar years from 1870 to 1929, there is no
discernible pattern between form and rate; in fact, the U.S. rate surpassed that
of Japan in all years but 1890-1900 and 1913-1929 and that of Germany in all
years but 1880-1900." In conjunction with the data on comparative
productivity, this indicates that changes in the rate of growth in productivity
cannot be readily attributed to differences in corporate governance structure
(unless there is a very long lag effect) and strengthens the view that the
fruitfulness of studying German and Japanese arrangements for improving U.S.
firms' competitive performance, and hence for proposing U.S. corporate
governance reforms, is problematic.
I. FURTHER COMPARISONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
INCLUDING EXAMPLES FROM U.S. HISTORY
The transferability of German and Japanese corporate forms to the United
States, as Roe suggests, is a tricky proposition. Evidence of the efficacy of
such an approach can be gleaned from examining American corporate financial
history, where similar arrangements appeared prior to the twentieth-century
financial regulation that Roe identifies as shaping current corporate institutions.
The evidence of the success of German- and Japanese-like corporate
governance arrangements in the United States is mixed. As David Teece points
out in reviewing the latest work of the distinguished business historian, Alfred
Chandler, "U.S. Steel provides one of the very few examples of banker control
in American industry."" As is chronicled by Chandler, U.S. Steel lost its
early leading position due to poor management decisions.'2 Teece concludes,
"Chandler leaves little doubt that he believes that the financiers and lawyers
running U.S. Steel made serious mistakes."' 3
A more hopeful example is provided in a fascinating study by J. Bradford
De Long, which indicates that at the turn of the century, adding a Morgan
banker to a corporate board increased the value of a firm's stock by 30%."
De Long finds no evidence that Morgan exploited the public investors. On the
contrary, he finds that companies with a Morgan director sold at higher
10. Id. at 88. With the exception of the years surrounding the Great Depression, the rate of U.S.
productivity growth remained higher than the international average from 1870 until the postwar period. Id.
11. David J. Teece, The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Perspectives on Alfred Chandler's Scale
and Scope, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 199, 205 n.12 (1993).
12. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 131-
40 (1990). After comparing the growth of industrial capitalism in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Germany, Chandler attributes much of the competitive success of firms to professional management.
Id at 593-97.
13. Teece, supra note I1, at 205 n.12.
14. J. Bradford De Long, Did J.P. Morgan's Men Add Value? An Economist's Perspective on
Financial Capitalism, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF
INFORMATION 205, 219 (Peter Temin ed., 1991).
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multiples of book value than other companies and that their stock offering
prices and subsequent rates of return were comparable to those of non-Morgan
companies.' 5 Although Morgan was engaged in both commercial and
investment banking at the time, De Long's data do not indicate whether
Morgan had any position, either as creditor or owner, in the companies on
whose boards its partners served. In addition, De Long is not able to determine
whether the source of the value added by a Morgan banker was due to
effective corporate governance or monopoly rents-whether the market viewed
a Morgan appointment as a screen for corporate quality (this assumes Morgan
directors actively monitored management so as to protect firm value) or as a
signal of future monopoly profits (this assumes the creation of market power
through business interconnections established with other Morgan firms).
One would be hard pressed to make predictions from these two
contradictory anecdotes concerning the direction of the effect that repealing the
Glass-Steagall Act would have on the value of industrial firms. Another
interesting study of early American banking by Naomi Lamoreaux further
muddies the water. Lamoreaux's research suggests that U.S. banks might not
adopt the German and Japanese banks' role of active investors even if the
option were made available to them. She finds that New England banks in the
late nineteenth century voluntarily exited from arrangements similar to those
of German and Japanese banks-ones in which banks lend to insiders with
interlocking bank and corporate managerial positions and actively monitor and
influence borrowers' behavior-and instead engaged in financial
intermediation; the new arrangements were undertaken for efficient risk-
reduction reasons. 16 Thus, in at least one region of the United States, the
divorce of private bankers and industrialists apparently began long before it
was required by federal statute.' 7
15. Id. at 218-24.
16. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Information Problems and Banks' Specialization in Short-Term Commercial
Lending: New England in the Nineteenth Century, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF INFORMATION 161 (Peter Temin, ed. 1991).
17. In response to my discussion of Lamoreaux's research on the transformation in New England
banking at the turn of the century, Roe suggests that the shift was due to regulation, citing Lance Davis'
research, particularly Davis' reference to restrictions on out-of-state lending by Massachusetts banks. Roe,
Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1962-63. Davis' work does not, however, support such a conclusion.
Davis' thesis is that capital immobility produces personal financial capitalism (whereby only financiers, for
example, Rockefeller and Morgan, can amass pools of capital to finance industry through personal contacts
with other financiers and banks); regulation, such as restrictions on national banking, renders capital
immobile. Lance E. Davis, Capital Immobilities and Finance Capitalism: A Study of Economic Evolution
in the United States 1820-1920, 1 EXPLORATIONS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL HIST. (2d set.) 88 (1963). Personal
financial capitalism is unnecessary when capital is mobile, as occurs once financial intermediation and
capital markets develop. Id. The form of banking produced by regulation according to Davis' thesis, then,
is exactly the personal form of banking that corresponds to the Japanese and German model that the New
England banks were abandoning. It is therefore unlikely that regulation produced the shift by those banks
toward financial intermediation. Second, the industries to which the banks were lending in Lamoreaux's
example, both before and after the change in practice she details, were typically local firms. Political
restrictions on national banking thus cannot explain the evolution in banking practices. Finally, Davis
distinguishes between commercial and savings banks throughout his discussion, and the Massachusetts out-
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Contemporary comparisons abroad reinforce the view that the behavior of
the New England banks might well be the response of U.S. banks today if
Glass-Steagall were repealed. As Jack Coffee has noted, U.K. firms are not
subject to the same type of ownership restrictions as U.S. firms, yet they have
dispersed stock ownership rather than the bank-dominated governance structure
of Germany. 18 This difference may be an historical accident; that is, it may
be due to disparate industrial development in England an&Germany in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that led to the establishment of
different financial institutions. 19 Industrialization occurred considerably later
in Germany than in England, at a time when the optimal plant size was much
larger and technology was more complex, requiring more capital and more
informed entrepreneurial guidance.20 The new German manufacturing firms,
in contrast to U.K. manufacturers, were unable to grow by reinvested earnings
or relying on small private banks. This necessitated new financial institutions,
such as innovative alliances between Rhenish firms and private bankers, joint-
stock issue banks, and reliance on government financing.2' As a consequence,
German banking developed along different lines from British banking.
Whatever the significance of fortuities in historical development for explaining
contemporary differences between England and Germany, the presence of these
differences makes plain that U.S. regulatory barriers are not a sufficient
explanation for the differences among U.S., German, and Japanese governance
structures.
Moreover, Japanese regulation has prohibited the development of capital
markets and forced corporations to rely on bank financing.2 When these
restrictions were loosened in the 1980's, there was a significant, dramatic shift
away from bank financing: the percentage of corporate debt of public
corporations that was bank debt went from 90% in 1975 to under 50% in
of-state lending restrictions to which Davis refers concerned savings banks. id. at 99. The banks Lamoreaux
discusses are, however, commercial banks. It is not at all apparent why state regulation of savings banks
would have an effect on the financing patterns of the banks that she studied. A difference between the
regulation of savings and commercial banks presumably explains what Roe points out as inconsistent with
the regulation referred to by Davis, an inability to make out-of-state loans and the holding of national
commercial paper by the banks that Lamoreaux discusses.
18. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991).
19. See RICHARD TILLY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE RHINELAND, 1815-
1870, 134-35 (1966).
20. HANS-HERMANN FRANCKE & MICHAEL HUDSON, BANKING AND FINANCE IN WEST GERMANY 4(1984). This thesis-variation in industrialization is related to a country's economic backwardness at the
time of its industrialization-is associated with the German economic historian, Alexander Gerschenkron.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK
OF ESSAYS (1962).
21. FRANCKE & HUDSON, supra note 20, at 55-63; TILLY, supra note 19, at 135.
22. See Takeo Hoshi et. al, The Choice Between Public and Private Debt: An Analysis of Post-
Deregulation Corporate Financing in Japan 4, 13-15 (Mar. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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1992.23 It remains to be seen whether the Japanese corporate governance
arrangement dependent on financial group ties that Roe emphasizes will
continue with the demise of its political (regulatory) support. For example,
Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein find that the more
successful group firms have lower bank debt after deregulation than the less
successful firms, which supports an insurance rationale for the Japanese
financial group organization-protecting poor managers-rather than an
efficiency explanation. 24 The development of Japanese corporate finance and
governance arrangements over the next decade will provide a much clearer
picture of whether we should be as skeptical of the efficacy (that is, economic
as opposed to political viability) of Japanese governance patterns as Roe is of
U.S. ones.
It would, therefore, be a mistake to maintain that U.S. corporate
governance institutions are better understood as shaped by political, rather than
economic, forces and hence are inefficient compared to those of Germany and
Japan. A more useful way of characterizing the connection between politics
and organizational form, particularly in the contractual context of business
firms, is to recognize that private parties are persistent in devising institutions
that circumvent, or at least minimize, political constraints on economic activity.
For example, Rhenish bankers and entrepreneurs created innovative financial
mechanisms that circumvented the Prussian government's restrictions on
economic development.' Closer to home, some large U.S. firms have
important relationships with banks, even though banks cannot own corporate
stock. Myron Slovin, Marie Sushka, and John Polonchek find, for example,
that the impending insolvency of the bank with which firms had their primary
lending relationships adversely affected the firms' stock prices.26 In addition,
seven of the 1990 Fortune top ten industrial firms had bankers (commercial or
investment) on their boards, and two of these corporations had financial
relations with the directors' banks of sufficient magnitude to report it in their
proxy statements. No doubt the relation-specific investments between U.S.
firms and banks are far more attenuated than those in Germany and Japan. As
in the case of German and Japanese firms, we also do not know if these
relationships produce benefits in corporate governance. But we must recognize
that even with Glass-Steagall, firms can enter into long-term relationships with
23. Id. at 1, 15-17.
24. Id. at 23-24.
25. For a detailed discussion of their efforts sed TILLY, supra note 19, at 134-38.
26. Myron B. Slovin, et al., The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as Bank Stakeholders, 48 J. FIN.
247 (1993) (reporting that client firms of Continental Illinois Bank experienced negative abnormal returns
of -4.2% during bank's impending insolvency).
27. The firms are as follows (with the number of directors affiliated with a bank indicated in
parentheses): General Motors (2), Exxon (0), Ford Motor (I), International Business Machines (0), Mobil
(0), General Electric (2), Philip Morris (3), Texaco (3), E.I. du Pont de Nemours (1), Chevron (1). The
1990 Fortune rankings of the largest U.S. industrial corporations were obtained from The Fortune 500,
FoRTUNE, Apr. 22, 1991, at 286, and the 1990 SEC proxies from LEXIS, Compny library, Proxy file.
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banks. While that statute's repeal will facilitate establishing such relationships,
it is far from obvious that U.S. firms will alter their existing banking
arrangements to replicate German and Japanese ones more closely.
Given the resourcefulness of private parties in arranging their affairs and
the data on comparative productivity, there is no reason to assume that the
constrained optimization problem of U.S. firms produces a less efficient
corporate structure than that of German and Japanese firms. In fact, the
opposite may well be closer to the truth; U.S. firms may be more efficiently
organized than their counterparts in other countries. This is because, although
Roe emphasizes the shortcomings of American politics, as the next Part
describes, the political process in other nations has, along some dimensions,
been less favorable for investors than that of the United States. The historical
and contemporary examples of the complicated relationship between U.S. firms
and banks do not argue for retaining current restrictions on banks' activities.
Rather, they highlight the limitations of projecting the impact of U.S. law
reform upon its corporate governance institutions from the experience of other
countries.
III. COMPARING THE OBJECTIVES OF CORPORATION CODES
In Roe's explanation, politics adversely dominates American corporate
organization. The negative effect of politics on firm structure in Germany and
Japan, in his analysis, appears to occur only in recent times when they have
experienced political pressure to adopt the U.S. pattern of restricting the
holding of corporate equity by banks. This perspective is, in my judgment,
questionable. As this Comment and Roe's article note, the strength of banks
in Germany and Japan is equally a function of their political processes as of
economics. Accordingly, to emphasize that one or the other organizational
form is politically driven tells us little about the desirability of that form.
Roe appears to suggest that a process that expands the activities of banks
is preferable to one that restricts those activities as he expresses some concern
over the changing political currents in Germany and Japan. In my view, his
concern over these changes is sensible only when shorn from his a priori
preference for financial institutions' monitoring of managers and instead related
to the nations' particular circumstances. Diminishing the activities of banks in
corporate governance in Germany and Japan is likely to be undesirable when
we consider the differences in corporation codes and practices concerning the
protection of shareholder interests in those countries compared to the United
States. Namely, in Germany, the control over managers exercised by banks is
a necessary counterweight to nonshareholder interests advanced in that
country's corporation code, and in Japan such control may be a constraint on
otherwise detrimental corporate group practices. This explanation underscores
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that the impact of U.S. financial regulatory reform on corporate governance
may not be that significant for U.S. investors.
The German corporation code, for example, in contrast to U.S. corporation
law, does not only seek to maximize shareholder welfare but has multiple
purposes. It mandates a system of codetermination in which employees elect
half of the supervisory board and participate in major corporate decisions, even
though their interests are plainly at odds with those of shareholders in many
circumstances. For instance, in decisions regarding potential acquisitions,
employees will prefer job security to increased share prices, and in the
selection of firm projects, as fixed claimants they will prefer less risk than will
shareholders. Such an arrangement is therefore not likely to maximize
shareholder value because conflicting interests must be reconciled (a firm will
be unable to operate effectively as if decisions are undertaken by bare majority
split votes).
There is some anecdotal evidence that codetermination is not the ideal
arrangement from the shareholders' perspective. First, commentators attribute
Volkswagen's financial difficulties to labor's alliance on the supervisory board
with the largest shareholder, the state government, which fostered a "politics
of jobs" that prevented the firm from cutting costs compared to its international
rivals.28 Second, firms do not voluntarily choose such a system. For example,
the two-tiered board system is explicitly available to French firms, but virtually
none have adopted it.29 Moreover, nothing in U.S. law prohibits the
representation of workers on corporate boards. If codetermination were a
value-maximizing strategy, we would not only find U.S. firms voluntarily
adopting such structures, but we would also see codetermination provisions
enacted over time, because the dynamics of state competition tends to lead
states to adopt laws that maximize shareholder wealth.3" The absence of the
institutions of codetermination in places where they are not legislatively
mandated is strong circumstantial evidence that investors do not benefit from
them.
28. Ferdinand Protzman, Volksivagen Sees Need for Shake-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1993, at DI, D8.
29. Klaus J. Hopt, Directors' Duties to Shareholders, Employees, and Other Creditors: A View from
the Continent, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 115, 116 (Ewan
McKendrick ed., 1992).
30. ROMANO, supra note 3, at ch. 2. There could be some additional organizational costs to adopting
codetermination institutions without authorizing legislation, but they are too insubstantial to explain the
absence of such corporate forms. For instance, to duplicate the German supervisory board, an employee
stock ownership plan could be created and provided with all the shares of one class of stock, which under
the charter would elect half of the board, while the publicly-traded common shares would elect the other
half. U.S. labor laws do not appear to restrict such employee involvement, as long as the corporate
structures are not shams to undermine independent union representation. Cf. NLRB Ruling on Employee
Participation Teams Not Seen as Closing the Door on All Such Efforts, 8 CORP. COUNSEL WEEKLY (BNA)
No. 2, at 8 (Jan. 6, 1993).
Germany is able to maintain a non-value-maximizing corporation code because both the continental
corporate law choice of law rule of physical presence, as opposed to statutory domicile, and the corporation
code harmonization process of the European Community stifle competition for corporate charters among
nations. See ROMANO, supra note 3, at ch. 6.
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Codetermination in all likelihood necessitates the concentration of voting
power in banks or some other form of block ownership, compared to U.S.
firms where dispersed shareholdings are not subject to an organized and legally
mandated opposition. This counterweight is the only clear cut mechanism to
protect the shareholders' interest from employees' institutional advantage over
dispersed investors to push firm decisions in their favor. But this rationale
involves an economic, and not a political, preference for active bank
involvement in German firms, which reduces the need for such an arrangement
in the United States.
In contrast to the German legal system, Japanese corporate law is not
formally at odds with the U.S. shareholder-centered regime, which is not
surprising because the United States imposed its legal rules on Japan after
World War II. Commentators, however, describe Japanese managers as
following objectives other than shareholder value maximization, such as
maximization of growth.31 Given the corporate group setting, in which the
most significant shareholders have dual roles as customers, suppliers, or
lenders, such an attitude is also not surprising. There has been little
investigation of which economic interest, the equity investment or the related
transaction, dominates such shareholders' decisions. Nevertheless, studies find
that firms in corporate groups (that is, firms with large corporate cross-
holdings other than banks) perform poorly,32 which suggests that the interfirm
transactions, and not the equity holdings, involve the more valuable
relationship. This finding is not replicated for firms in financial groups (i.e.,
firms whose largest corporate shareholders are banks).33 This suggests that
banks could play a positive role, from the public investors' perspective, by
offsetting the decisional power of the other business-related shareholders, just
as German banks counter the employees' role in corporate decisions.
In addition, I am more skeptical than Roe concerning the extent of
Japanese shareholder "power" that benefits public investors, particularly given
his view that annual meetings are not fractious because management has large
shareholders' support. Management uses several tactics to ensure peace at
meetings that are not obviously related to promoting investor participation.
Most Japanese corporations hold their annual meeting on the same day to
prevent shareholder attendance, and some firms pay individuals (called sokaiya
or professional extortionists) to ensure smooth flowing meetings by, for
example, "shouting down and threatening shareholders who question the
31. See, e.g., W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 76-77 (1991).
32. FRANK R. LICHTENBERG & GEORGE M. PUSHNER, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN 10, 18, 22-23 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4092,
1992) (reviewing literature and providing additional confirming evidence).
33. Id.
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company's management."34 Large shareholders' acquiescence in such tactics
may well be another example of the pull of Japanese blockholders' dual roles,
casting doubt on whether the group structure unambiguously benefits ordinary
shareholders (investors who have no relation with the firm besides their equity
capital).
It is puzzling that Roe praises the common German and Japanese
institution of corporate governance-bank monitoring-while recognizing that
improving corporate governance may not even be its primary purpose. In this
regard, the motivation for a comparative study, at least on corporate
governance grounds, is ambiguous, for we conventionally understand by that
subject institutional arrangements that maximize the value of the firm (i.e.,
institutions that promote the shareholders' interest). Roe offers no comparative
data demonstrating that the public shareholders of German and Japanese firms
do better than, or as well as, their U.S. counterparts. Yet such comparative
information is essential for any lessons to be drawn from comparing corporate
governance institutions across nations. As mentioned earlier, it is quite possible
that the institutional blockholders in German and Japanese corporations could
operate the firms to safeguard or favor their nonshareholder positions at the
public shareholders' expense. Roe further notes what other commentators have
suggested, that the German and Japanese governance arrangements were
adopted to protect incumbent corporate managements from control changes.
This is the same explanation that he offers for U.S. laws and regulations
preventing such arrangements. It would be helpful to explain why the effort in
one but not in the other case may be expected to benefit public investors.
To motivate a monitoring rather than managerialist explanation of the
German and Japanese arrangement, Roe emphasizes that, unlike their American
counterparts, German and Japanese managers share power. This explanation
is not convincing. German and Japanese managers share power with other
managers, not with shareholders whose personal investments are on the line.
A common view in the corporate board literature is that interlocking corporate
directors are more accommodating of top management than independent
directors as they follow a "golden rule" of directorship: one manager in the
role of board member for a second manager's firm does not question the
second's decisions and that second manager as a member of the board of
34. James Stemgold, Head of Big Japan Company Quits in Gangster Payments, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1992, at D3, D3.
35. The separation of commercial and investment banking under the Glass-Steagall Act contributed
to the development of U.S. capital markets, as it pushed firms to resort to public markets, as opposed to
banks, for capital. See BRUNO SOLNIK, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS 101 (2d ed. 1991). Despite Roe's
suggestion to the contrary, it is not at all self-evident that investing through bank deposits is preferable to
investing in equities directly or through mutual funds. Indeed, one of the most important trends in
financing, known as securitization, involves repackaging and reselling bank loans in public capital markets.
To determine whether individual investors are disadvantaged by the U.S. situation, we need to compare the
returns to individuals investing in the U.S. stock market with the interest earned by German bank
depositors, as well as the interest earned by U.S. bank depositors. This is no small task.
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directors of the first manager's firm does not question the first's decisions. Roe
provides no reason to expect a different scenario in the Japanese group setting,
other than the assertion that the stock ownership of the manager's firm makes
a difference. But this contention overlooks two important facts that indicate the
attenuation of managerial incentives to act in stockholder interests: (1)
corporate ownership runs in both directions (the first manager's firm owns the
second firm's stock and the second manager's firm owns the first firm's stock)
and (2) Japanese managers hold even fewer shares of their own firms than
U.S. managers.36 Without more concrete information about the behavior of
Japanese firms and managers, it is impossible to conclude that shared authority
fosters effective shareholder monitoring rather than mutual accommodation and
managerial entrenchment on a par or greater than that present in U.S. firms.
IV. AGENCY COSTS AS "UNIVERSAL THEORY"
In the initial part of his article, Roe sets up as the object of criticism a
view of the modern business firm that he terms the "classical economic
model," which is principally derived from Michael Jensen and William
Meckling's seminal article on agency costs. 37 His critique is mistaken, and it
is superfluous to his thesis.
In particular, Roe's conceptualization of agency cost theory has it
backwards. He contends that agency cost theory predicts the separation of
ownership and control. Agency theory predicts that a variety of institutional
arrangements will appear to minimize losses arising from agency problems
given the separation of ownership and control. It does not predict the
separation of ownership and control (i.e., dispersed ownership). I am aware of
no statement of agency theory suggesting that concentration of share ownership
in blocks by banks or other investors is not a possible solution to the problem
of organizing a firm in which the managers and owners will not be identical.
Indeed, economists working in this area have modeled and empirically
investigated such a response.38 I am also not aware of any paper by any
agency theorist that makes any of the claims that Roe makes for the theory:
36. Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and
the U.S. (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (median holding of Japanese manager is
0.23% compared to U.S. manager's median holding of 1.17%; Japanese managers' average holding is 0.9%
compared to U.S. managers' average holding of 5.59%). Similar to the findings of studies of U.S. firms,
Lichtenberg and Pushner, supra note 32, at 22-23, find that the performance of Japanese firms is positively
correlated with insiders' stock ownership.
37. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Transaction cost economics is also integral
to the theory of the firm Roe describes. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985).
38. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders
and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. EON. 461 (1986).
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that "corporate ownership mediated through securities markets is the highest
form of financial development, successfully providing ownership,
diversification and liquidity in just the right proportions"; 39 that large firms
in every economy should develop the same organization; that if there were
international differences in corporate organization it would mean that
"corporate structure might not matter"; that differences could not exist across
firms in their organization; and so forth.40 Commentators acquainted with the
literature would be astonished to learn that it makes such strange claims.
Indeed, scholars have relied on the theory to make comparisons that Roe
considers impossible by definition; they have contended that Germany and
Japan did not have or need active takeover markets because they resolved
agency problems differently from the United States.4'
Of course, in all of the countries that Roe discusses, there are large
corporations where ownership is separate from control-neither German banks
nor Japanese affiliated companies in corporate groups are 100% shareholders,
nor do they directly manage day-to-day operations. Roe shows that firms in
Germany and Japan have typically resolved the agency problem differently
from U.S. firms, and that U.S. statutes and regulations tend42 to restrict the
use of such solutions for U.S. firms. But cross-country disparity does not
disprove agency theory in the way any of its proponents have used it as
opposed to Roe's conceptualization of it-to explain important features of U.S.
corporate law, such as viewing the board of directors as a mechanism to
mitigate agency costs.
The impact of the state on corporate organization is not, as Roe implies,
a factor incompatible with agency cost explanations of corporate organization.
Rather, because models using agency theory are by definition constrained
optimization problems-the residual loss is positive and hence the first best
equilibrium that eliminates the agency problem cannot be achieved-the
political constraints that Roe emphasizes can best be characterized as one
reason why the residual loss does not shrink to zero (i.e., firms minimize
agency costs subject to constraints, including legal prohibitions on particular
organizational forms). Roe would be correct in criticizing agency cost theory,
while advancing his view of the predominance of political constraints in
shaping corporate organization, were he simply to emphasize that scholars in
39. Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1935.
40. Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1934. Roe does not provide any attributable quotations
or citations to the conceptualization of the position that he is criticizing.
41. E.g., Mike Wright et al., Corporate Restructuring, Buy-Outs, and Managerial Equity: The
European Dimension, 3 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1991, at 47, 47-48 (Germany); KESTER, supra note
31, at 271 (Japan).
42. I use the term "tend" advisedly because, as Roe notes with the Warren Buffet example, it is not
impossible for financial institutions to become significant blockholders in U.S. firms, and several studies
have found that a majority of U.S. corporations do have significant block owners. See, Demsetz & Lehn,
supra note 38.
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the agency cost tradition have not added regulation as a side constraint. But
that omission is not his objection. Roe's position is surely consonant with an
agency cost theory of the firm; his critique, which implies that the two are
incompatible, is misplaced.
CONCLUSION
Mark Roe has provided in his article important detail on the organization
of German and Japanese corporations. This is a valuable contribution to our
understanding of corporate law because it emphasizes the great variability in
corporate arrangements. It also strengthens the case for relaxing U.S. rules that
restrict the choice of organizational form.
While Roe is careful to qualify the conclusions to be drawn from his
comparative research, this Comment has emphasized the need for readers to
pay close attention to his qualifications, because the most natural implication
of such comparative analysis is to assume that German and Japanese corporate
governance arrangements should be emulated by U.S. firms and this is a
dubious proposition. Not only can no tight connection be demonstrated
between corporate governance institutions and international competitiveness,
but also, U.S. firms are, in fact, more productive than their German or
Japanese counterparts. In addition, there is no evidence that the U.S. political
process interferes more in the optimal organization of its corporations than the
German or Japanese processes do in theirs. The German code, for instance, is
explicitly multi-purpose, interjecting nonshareholder interests into the
corporation's objective function. Interfirm equity cross-holdings in Japanese
corporate groups, like U.S. restrictions on financial institutions' stock
ownership, were instigated, in part, to protect management from control
changes, and to serve noncorporate governance functions (protecting business
relations across firms). Other regulations promoted the monopoly power of
Japanese banks by restricting firms' ability to access public capital markets. It
is therefore difficult, as Roe notes, to make comparative assessments
concerning the relative superiority of one form or another, or to assume that
reforming one nation's laws by copying another's will produce similar
arrangements.
Agency cost explanations of the corporate form are not, as Roe contends,
incompatible with variety in corporate organization across nations or with his
emphasis on the path dependency in organizational form that originates in
domestic politics. Rather, agency theory is a theory of constrained optimization
that predicts the development of a variety of institutional devices to mitigate
the adverse consequences for investors of the separation of ownership and
control. It can therefore incorporate political as well as economic constraints
on firm organization.
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Roe presents the political process as at odds with efficient economic
organization. The most useful way to think about the relation between politics
and economic organization, however, is to recognize that private parties are
persistent in devising institutions that circumvent, or minimize the effect of,
political constraints on economic activity. This is, in my opinion, the principal
lesson to be learned from doing comparative corporate law.

